Human rights lawyer, Femi Falana (SAN), has renewed calls for a fundamental reset of Nigeria’s security strategy, insisting that the country’s armed forces can defeat terrorism and banditry if they are properly equipped, adequately funded and professionally managed, without relying on foreign military intervention.
Speaking in Ilawe Ekiti over the weekend, Falana argued that what he repeatedly described as “ragtag armies of criminal elements” have been allowed to gain advantage over state forces because of years of underfunding, corruption and institutional neglect within Nigeria’s security architecture. He warned that inviting or endorsing foreign combat roles, particularly on religious grounds, risks deepening internal divisions and undermining the country’s sovereignty.
Falana maintained that the Nigerian military, despite current challenges, retains the capacity to reclaim territory and restore security if its personnel are properly equipped and motivated.
According to him, “If the members of the armed forces are well equipped and motivated, they can deal with terrorism and banditry. But as a result of the neglect of vital security institutions over the years, the ragtag armies of criminal elements are winning the war on terror. It is a shame.”
He said videos routinely released by armed groups show insurgents and bandits displaying sophisticated weapons and equipment that, in many instances, appear superior to what is available to Nigerian troops on the frontlines. For Falana, this contrast underscores what he described as a systemic failure by successive administrations to prioritise professional security procurement, welfare and accountability.
Falana stressed that, under the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the primary responsibility for security lies with the Nigerian state, not external powers. He stated that “to secure Nigeria is not the business of any foreign nation; it is the duty of the government under the constitution, and that duty must be carried out by the government,” adding that there is “no indication that the government is incompetent and cannot secure Nigeria” if it decisively addresses the known structural problems within the system.
Central to Falana’s argument is the long-standing issue of corruption in defence procurement, a theme that has shaped public debate on Nigeria’s war against insurgency since the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan and continued under President Muhammadu Buhari.
From around 2014, as Boko Haram intensified attacks in the North-East, questions began to emerge over how trillions of naira budgeted for defence and security were being spent. Under President Buhari, the former National Security Adviser, Col. Sambo Dasuki (retd.), and several military officers, politicians and contractors were accused of diverting funds earmarked for arms purchase in what became widely known as the “arms procurement scandal” or “Dasukigate”.
Falana referenced this history and the trials that followed, stating: “How do you fight terrorism in an environment where the money budgeted for the procurement of arms and ammunition is stolen by well-known criminal elements in society?”
He explained that he has, over time, defended military personnel charged with war-related offences and other infractions under the Armed Forces Act. In his words, “From time to time, I defend military officers and soldiers who are charged with war crimes and other offences under the Armed Forces Act. I know that they are prepared to prosecute the counter-insurgency operation, but they lack vital equipment.”
He alleged that “the money earmarked for the procurement of arms and ammunition was stolen by a coterie of military officers and their civilian collaborators,” and faulted what he described as a pattern of judicial outcomes that, in his view, have allowed some high-profile suspects to escape full trial or accountability.
Falana cited specific instances, saying: “For instance, a service chief was charged with stealing ₦22.8bn. The Federal High Court freed him on the ground that he was not charged before a court martial. Meanwhile, he was charged with money laundering, which can only be tried exclusively by the Federal High Court.
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“A former governor was charged with stealing ₦6.9bn from the Office of the then National Security Adviser, Col. Sambo Dasuki. A judge has just freed him without even allowing him to defend himself.
“A few other military officers and civilians who stole about ₦200bn have been asked to go home and enjoy the stolen funds earmarked for the purchase of military hardware. Meanwhile, our soldiers are ill-equipped because of the criminal diversion of huge funds.”
Although Falana did not mention names in his latest comments, his remarks echo a decade-long controversy over the handling of security funds, including high-profile cases brought by anti-graft agencies before the Federal High Court and other superior courts of record. Some of these cases have ended in acquittals, striking out of charges, or prolonged delays, often triggering public criticism of both prosecutorial strategy and judicial decisions. In several instances, the defendants have maintained their innocence and insisted that due process must run its course.
Falana argued that this state of affairs has had direct consequences on the field, where soldiers complain of inadequate equipment, delayed allowances and poor welfare conditions even as they confront heavily armed non-state actors across multiple fronts.
To address what he called the “criminal diversion” of military procurement funds, Falana urged the Federal Government to set up a clear, credible and enforceable mechanism for the recovery of all monies allegedly stolen from arms and ammunition budgets.
“So, the government must put in place a mechanism for the recovery of money meant for the procurement of arms and ammunition which has been stolen, with a view to using the funds for the purpose for which they were meant as a matter of urgency,” he said.
The senior lawyer suggested that, beyond investigations and court trials, there must be a determined policy to trace, seize and repurpose such funds so they can directly support troops on the ground. He insisted that Nigeria does not lack the resources or personnel to secure itself, but must confront entrenched corruption and decisively reform defence procurement systems.
According to Falana, “If you equip your armed forces and motivate the members, Nigeria can fight terrorism and banditry without the intervention of any country.”
Falana’s renewed critique comes against the backdrop of an evolving security crisis that has, over the past decade and a half, moved from a largely North-East insurgency to a nationwide web of threats including banditry, mass abductions, rural killings, farmer-herder conflicts, and urban kidnappings for ransom.
Boko Haram’s violent campaign, which gained prominence around 2009 and escalated sharply after 2011, initially targeted police stations, public buildings and places of worship in the North-East and parts of the North-Central. By 2014, the group’s activities culminated in the abduction of schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno State, triggering global outrage and the “Bring Back Our Girls” campaign. Splinter factions such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) later emerged, complicating counter-insurgency operations.
As federal and state authorities focused on Boko Haram and ISWAP, new armed groups, commonly labelled “bandits” in public discourse and official communications, expanded across the North-West and parts of the North-Central. These groups have been linked to repeated attacks on rural communities, mass kidnappings on highways and schools, cattle rustling and the imposition of illegal levies on farmers and villagers.
Despite successive military operations, including “Operation Lafiya Dole”, “Operation Hadin Kai”, and several joint operations with other security agencies, the violence has persisted, often shifting in intensity and geography. In recent years, high-profile incidents such as the Kankara, Kagara and Jangebe school abductions, the Abuja-Kaduna train attack, and recurring mass kidnappings in communities in Kaduna, Katsina, Niger, Zamfara, Plateau and other states have kept insecurity at the top of national discourse.
In the last quarter of the previous year, insecurity “took an ugly turn” again, with a fresh spike in banditry, killings and ransom kidnappings reported across different regions. This surge, coupled with economic hardship and rising youth unemployment, has fuelled renewed scrutiny of the effectiveness, accountability and sustainability of Nigeria’s security strategy.
It is against this tense backdrop that reports emerged of a United States airstrike on a reported terrorist target in Sokoto State on Christmas Day. The Federal Government has publicly stated that it provided intelligence for the operation, indicating some level of cooperation or coordination with US forces.
The move has generated mixed reactions across the country, reviving long-running debates about foreign military involvement in Nigeria’s internal security operations. The controversy intensified after former US President Donald Trump, commenting on the situation in Nigeria, described the violence primarily as an “attack on Christians” and framed the airstrike as an intervention to protect Christian populations.
Falana strongly rejected that framing and warned the Nigerian government against allowing any foreign actor, including Trump, to reshape the internal conflict along religious lines.
Speaking on the Sokoto airstrike and the Federal Government’s role, he said: “Let the Nigerian government be warned not to allow US President Mr Donald Trump to promote religious war in Nigeria. Trump is saying his intervention is to protect Christians.
“The criminals that are killing Nigerians do not care about religion; those who are collecting ransom after kidnapping Nigerians do not worry about religion. Therefore, the war against terror in Nigeria must be carried out without any attempt to divide our people along religious and ethnic lines.”
Nigeria’s conflict landscape has always carried a delicate religious and ethnic dimension. Attacks on churches, mosques and religious figures by insurgents and criminal gangs have repeatedly raised fears of sectarian escalation. However, security agencies and many local accounts have also documented patterns of indiscriminate violence, with both Muslims and Christians, and various ethnic communities, suffering casualties, abductions and displacement.
Falana’s warning taps into a long-standing consensus among many civic and religious leaders that foreign narratives which reduce Nigeria’s complex security challenges to a one-dimensional “Christian–Muslim” conflict risk fuelling polarisation, reprisals and mistrust. His position aligns with calls for caution in accepting external characterisations of the crisis that may not fully reflect the internal realities on the ground.
Nigeria’s collaboration with foreign powers on security predates the current phase of insurgency. Over the years, the country has engaged in varying levels of cooperation, from intelligence sharing and training agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, France and other partners, to equipment purchases and limited operational support.
However, memories of past controversies still linger. During the Jonathan administration, attempts to procure arms from abroad, including reports of South African cash seizures linked to arms deals, raised questions about transparency and compliance with foreign export regulations. Under President Buhari, Nigeria sought assistance from Western and regional partners to tackle Boko Haram and ISWAP, including through the Multinational Joint Task Force involving neighbouring countries.
Each episode has revived debates over sovereignty, domestic accountability and the extent to which external powers should play direct roles in Nigeria’s internal conflicts. Falana’s latest comments build on that history, but sharpen the focus on the dangers of explicitly religious justifications for intervention.
By cautioning the Federal Government not to allow Trump “to promote religious war in Nigeria”, he is effectively arguing that policy decisions in Abuja must not be driven by or publicly tied to foreign political narratives that cast Nigeria’s multi-layered security crisis as a simple war against or for one faith.
Beyond hardware and high politics, Falana stressed that any sustainable response to insecurity must address what he termed “social insecurity”, particularly youth unemployment and deepening economic hardship.
“Also, you cannot end insecurity in a country without addressing social insecurity. If young people are unemployed and unemployment is on the increase, some of them are likely to be driven to criminality. It is often said that ‘the devil finds work for idle hands’,” he said.
Nigeria has, for years, grappled with high youth unemployment and underemployment rates, a situation exacerbated by slow economic growth, inflation, and structural constraints in education and the labour market. Various reports by national and international institutions have repeatedly identified unemployment, poverty, inequality and weak state presence in rural and peri-urban communities as factors that can make young people more vulnerable to recruitment by criminal groups, insurgents and armed gangs.
Falana therefore urged that, “while the government is being pressured to fund and equip the armed forces and the Nigerian Police Force, sufficient attention must be paid to youth unemployment.”
His comments reflect a broader school of thought that sees Nigeria’s security crisis as both a law-and-order challenge and a socio-economic problem. While not excusing criminality, this perspective argues that large pools of disaffected, jobless or underemployed youths, combined with porous borders, small arms proliferation and corruption, create fertile ground for the growth and resilience of non-state armed groups.
