The slaughter in Woro, a remote community in Kaiama Local Government Area of Kwara State, was not a random outburst of violence. Evidence gathered by investigators and security analysts points to a calculated expansion of a jihadist front led by Abubakar Saidu, popularly known as Sadiku — the man now described as the “landlord” of the Kainji Forest Reserve and the architect of a campaign of terror that culminated in one of Kwara’s deadliest massacres. Saturday PUNCH
Survivors and analysts say Tuesday’s attack left roughly 176 people dead, scores wounded and dozens missing. More than 50 survivors are being treated in Ilorin hospitals. Entire villages have been emptied; mass burials have already taken place as families search for loved ones buried in bushes, rivers and farmlands.
Investigations by PUNCH show Sadiku’s rise was years in the making. Security sources trace his trajectory back to 2014, when he was reportedly handpicked by the late Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau to extend the insurgency’s reach beyond the North‑East. As military pressure squeezed Boko Haram’s strongholds, Sadiku moved west, forging tactical alliances with bandit groups — notably with Dogo Gide — before splitting with some partners over ideology and control.
Analysts say the turning point came in July 2025, when Sadiku established a base in the Kainji Forest Reserve, a dense corridor spanning Niger and Kwara states. From that forest, security experts warn, he transformed from a transactional bandit ally into a rigidly ideological commander, modeled by some as the “Shekau of the North‑Central.”
The Kainji Forest Reserve has become a strategic hub linking remnants of Boko Haram in the East with bandit and Sahelian extremist networks in the West. Security researchers describe it as Nigeria’s “new Sambisa” — a place for recruitment, weapons movement and cross‑border coordination that now threatens rural communities across Niger, Kwara, Kebbi and parts of Kaduna.
Open‑source trackers and regional analysts have documented mounting operational links between Sadiku’s faction and Jama’at Nusrat al‑Islam wal‑Muslimin (JNIM), the Al‑Qaeda affiliate active in the Sahel. Some reports say fighters from both groups have operated in overlapping zones near Nuku and Papiri, suggesting either a tactical alliance or at least a non‑aggression understanding that has enabled a sustained southward push.
Woro’s leaders say the attack was foreshadowed. The village head, Umar Salihu, told investigators a letter dated 19 Rajab 1447 (January 8) and signed “JAS” arrived weeks before the massacre, requesting a “secret” meeting to preach and promising no harm. Salihu photocopied the letter, handed a copy to the Kaiama Emirate and forwarded a soft copy to the security officer in Kaiama.
On the day of the attack, witnesses say hundreds of gunmen arrived on motorcycles around 5pm, armed with AK‑47s and explosives. They ringed the settlement and by about 6pm stormed the emir’s palace, dragging out his family and setting the building ablaze. Between 6:30pm and 8pm the assailants entered what survivors described as an “execution phase,” rounding up men, binding their hands and killing many systematically. A white helicopter with markings was seen briefly overhead but left without intervening; a military aircraft returned later, forcing the attackers to pull back temporarily. Believing danger had passed, some residents emerged; the gunmen used the call to prayer as a ruse to lure people out and resumed their killing until around 2am, then retreated into the forest with abducted women and children.
Survivors’ testimony
ZulQharnain Shero Musa, media aide to the Kaiama local government chairman and a survivor, described attackers in “large numbers” moving from house to house, executing residents and stopping motorists on the federal road. “They were heavily armed with sophisticated weapons… There was no immediate security presence when they arrived,” he said, describing bodies recovered from homes and fields and a community emptied of life.
Another survivor, Aliyu Abdul Hamid Jogodo, said attackers kidnapped relatives and killed local officials, including Dr Muhammad Yusuf, officer‑in‑charge of the Woro Primary Health Care centre. A trader, Ruqqoyat Solihudeen, said some attackers wore military uniforms and one woman wore a hijab and carried ammunition, disguises that helped them move without suspicion.
Why security response failed
Intelligence officers acknowledge the security apparatus was alerted but hampered. Officials report explosives were planted on roads to delay rescue convoys; one truck was hit, slowing response. A senior intelligence source told investigators that while teams were deployed, the remote, forested terrain and simultaneous attacks across multiple areas left security forces overstretched and unable to reach Woro until hours after the slaughter.
Security experts fault systemic failures: porous borders, thin rural presence, weak coordination among agencies and poor accountability. Kabiru Adamu, a security analyst, warned that without structural reforms and clear accountability for lapses, attacks like Woro will continue as extremists exploit gaps to raise funds, procure weapons and extend their reach.
The human and political aftermath
The Kwara governor, AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq, has set up a seven‑member committee to coordinate relief and reconstruction in Woro. Chaired by former lawmaker Ahmed Kiwozi, the panel has a four‑week mandate to assess survivors’ needs and lead rebuilding efforts, the governor’s office said. Senator Sadiq Umar, representing Kwara North, visited victims in Ilorin and pledged continued support and calls for sustained security operations across the region.
Researchers and regional watchers warn that arresting one group’s leader will not solve a deepening problem: insurgents are shifting geography, coalescing with Sahelian networks and exploiting forests that have become sanctuaries. Some fighters previously under the Mahmuda influence reportedly joined Sadiku after that group’s leader was arrested in August 2025, further consolidating power around the Kainji axis.
What now
Woro’s survivors demand protection, relief and justice. Security analysts demand decisive action to dismantle forest sanctuaries, tighten border controls, fix rural intelligence and hold leaders accountable for lapses. For families picking through the ash and graves, such reforms cannot come soon enough.
As Kwara mourns, the Woro massacre starkly exposes how local warnings and fractured security systems allowed a long‑growing threat — led by a figure once in Shekau’s circle — to metastasize into a new and deadly front in Nigeria’s evolving insurgency. The challenge now is not only to rescue survivors and rebuild homes, but to sever the networks and sanctuaries that made the slaughter possible.
